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Human interactions often involve a choice between acting selfishly (in ones' own interest) and acting 
prosocially (in the interest of others). Fast-and-slow models of prosociality posit that people intuitively favour 
one of these choices (the selfish choice in some models, the prosocial choice in other models), and need to 
correct this intuition through deliberation in order to make the other choice. We present 7 studies that force 
us to reconsider this longstanding “corrective” dual process view. Participants played various economic 
games in which they had to choose between a prosocial and a selfish option. We used a two-response 
paradigm in which participants had to give their first, initial response under time-pressure and cognitive load. 
Next, participants could take all the time they wanted to reflect on the problem and give a final response. This 
allowed us to identify the intuitively generated response that preceded the final response given after 
deliberation. Results consistently showed that both prosocial and selfish responses were predominantly made 
intuitively rather than after deliberate correction. Pace the deliberate correction view, the findings indicate 
that making prosocial and selfish choices does typically not rely on different types of reasoning modes 








 Humans show unique prosocial behavior. Often we are willing to pay a personal cost to help 
strangers who we never expect to encounter again (Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007). This prosocial tendency 
is a key factor that allows human societies and economies to prosper (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Tomasello, 
2019). Economists, psychologists and other social scientists have long tried to pinpoint the mechanisms 
underlying human prosociality. Recent experimental work has been heavily influenced by the dual process 
framework that conceives human thinking as resulting from an interplay between fast intuition and slow 
deliberation (Kahneman, 2011). For example, one popular deliberate prosociality view entails that making 
prosocial choices requires deliberate control of our intuitive selfish impulses (e.g., DeWall, Baumeister, 
Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013). An 
alternative deliberate selfishness view entails that our intuitions favor prosocial choices and it is only after 
deliberation that we will seek to maximize our self-interest (e.g., Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; Sanfey, 
Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003).  
 Despite the differences with respect to which behavior is assumed to be favored by deliberation and 
the—extensive—resulting  debate (e.g., Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Bouwmeester et al., 2017; Capraro & 
Cococcioni, 2016; Rand, 2016, 2019; Tinghög et al., 2013, 2016; see Capraro, 2019 for a review), both the 
deliberate prosociality and deliberate selfishness view are built on the same underlying corrective deliberation 
model:  Intuition will favor one type of behavior whereas making the competing choice will require slow, 
deliberate processes to control and correct the initial intuitive impulse (Wills, Hackel, & Van Bavel, 2019). If 
correct, such deliberate correction model holds interesting policy implications and promises since it implies 
that we can steer people towards more/less prosocial behavior by simply pushing them to deliberate 
more/less (Krajbich, Bartling, Hare, & Fehr, 2015).  
 Here we present a critical direct test of the underlying deliberate correction model. In our studies 
participants played incentivized, anonymous, one-shot economic games in which they had to choose to 
maximize their self-interest or opt for a prosocial choice. These classic  games vary in their specifics but in all 
of them the prosocial choice consisted in paying a personal cost to give a benefit to others (Dictator Game, 
DG; Public Goods Game, PG) or to punish others’ selfish behavior (second-mover Ultimatum Game, UG). 
Each game involves a specific sub-type of prosocial behavior (e.g., altruism, DG; costly punishment, UG; 
cooperation, PG). By including the various games we aimed to get the broadest possible test of the deliberate 
correction model of prosocial behavior.  
 We used a two-response paradigm (e.g., Kessler, Kivimaki, & Niederle, 2017; Krawczyk & 
Sylwestrzak, 2018; Thompson, Turner, & Pennycook, 2011) in which participants initially had to respond as 
fast as possible with the first intuitive answer that came to mind. Immediately afterwards they were given all 
the time they wanted to reflect and give a final answer. To make maximally sure that the initial response was  
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generated intuitively, possible deliberation was experimentally “knocked-out” by having people make their 
initial choice under time-pressure (i.e., a 2 s to 6 s response deadline) and concurrent cognitive load (i.e., 
memorization of a complex visual pattern). Given that deliberate processing is assumed to be more time and 
cognitive resource demanding than intuitive processing, forcing people to respond under time-pressure and 
load minimizes the possibility that people will deliberate during the initial response phase (Bago & De Neys, 
2017, 2019). If the dual process correction model is correct, we expect that the alleged deliberate response—
be it selfish or prosocial— will only (or at least predominantly) be observed in the final response stage after 
correction of one’s initial response (i.e., selfish-to-prosocial or prosocial-to-selfish changes).  
 We ran a total of seven studies. The various studies tested the generality and robustness of the 
findings across different games and methodological refinements.  
 





112 Hungarian students (79 female, Mean age = 22.1 years, SD = 2.23 years) from the Eotvos 
Lorand University of Budapest were tested. A total of 86.7% of participants reported high school as the 
highest completed educational level, while 13.3% reported having a postsecondary education degree. 
Participants received course credit in return for participation and a possible monetary bonus payment (see 
further).  
The sample size decision was based on previous two-response studies in the logical and moral 
reasoning field (Bago & De Neys, 2017, 2019) in which approximately 100 participants per condition were 
tested. 
Participants in Study 1-4 were recruited from a pool which was renewed each semester and consisted 
of approximately 400 individuals. Study 1 and 4 were run in the same semester, Study 2 and 3 in the 
subsequent semester. All participants participated online. Recruitment numbers were regularly checked and 
manually stopped when at least 100 participants were tested or the pool was depleted.  Each semester 
participants for the one-response pretests (see further) were recruited after the main two-response studies 
were completed.  
 
Materials 
 Dictator Game (DG). We designed the two-choice DG following Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni, and 
Utikal (2014). Participants were presented with a total of 16 DG trials (8 standard and 8 control, see further). 
In each trial, participants played the role of Dictator and were asked to divide 100 points (which were later 
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converted into money, at a rate of 1 point = 3 HUF, approximately $0.01) between a new anonymous other 
player and themselves. Each trial presented two allocations of the 100 points. One allocation was always more 
fair (equal) than the other. For example: 
 
a) You keep 61, and the other player gets 39.  
b) You keep 51, and the other player gets 49. 
 
 For the fair option, we used four types of quasi-equal allocations: 51/49, 52/48, 53/47, 54/46. To 
avoid an “equality heuristic” (Schulz et al., 2014), we did not use the absolute fair 50/50 allocation and always 
allotted the largest share of the quasi-equal fair split to the participant. For the unfair option, we used both 
high difference trials (81/19, 82/18, 83/17, or 84/16) and low difference trials (61/39, 62/38, 63/37, or 
64/36). Fair and unfair options were paired together such that the difference between the participant’s gains 
in all high and low difference trials remained constant (e.g., the unfair 81/19 and 82/18 options were paired 
with fair options 51/49 and 52/48, respectively). Note that the high and low difference factor did not affect 
the correction findings and was not further considered. The presentation order of the fair and unfair option 
was counterbalanced.  
 In addition to 8 standard DG trials, we also presented 8 control DG trials. In the standard problems 
the participant maximized self-interest by selecting the unfair split. Thus, selfish and prosocial fairness 
considerations cue conflicting choices. In the control trials, the participant gained more by selecting the quasi-
equal fair split. This was achieved by changing the pay-off structure of the unfair option; in control trials the 
participants received the smallest share of the unfair split. For example: 
 
a) You keep 39, and the other player gets 61.  
b) You keep 51, and the other player gets 49. 
 
Thus, in control trials selfish and prosocial fairness considerations cued the same response (i.e., the fair 
split). This should result in a high, non-random selection rate of this response option (Engel, 2011). For 
convenience, we label the response as the selfish choice. The presentation order of the two response options 
was counterbalanced and the same allocation combinations as in the standard trials were used. The eight 
standard and control trials were presented in random order.  
Control trials allowed us to test for a guessing confound and are reported in this context. Unless 
otherwise noticed all reported results in the main text and supplementary material concern the critical 




Load task. We wanted to make maximally sure that participants’ initial response was intuitive (i.e., 
deliberation is minimized). Therefore, we used a cognitive load task (i.e., the dot memorization task, see 
Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001) to burden participants’ cognitive resources while they 
were making their initial choice. The rationale behind the load manipulation is simple; dual process theories 
assume that deliberation requires more cognitive resources than intuition (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
Consequently, if we burden someone’s cognitive resources, it will be less likely that they can engage in 
deliberation. We opted for the dot memorization task because it has been repeatedly shown to hinder 
deliberation during logical reasoning and economic game decision making (De Neys, Novitskiy, Geeraerts, 
Ramautar, & Wagemans, 2011; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; De Neys & Verschueren, 2006; Franssens & De 
Neys, 2009). Before each game, participants were presented with a 3 x 3 grid, in which four grid squares were 
filled with crosses (see Figure 1 and S1). Participants were instructed that it was critical to memorize the 
location of the crosses even though it might be hard while making a game decision. After the DG choice was 
made, participants were shown four different matrices and they had to choose the correct, to-be-memorized 
pattern. They received feedback as to whether they chose the correct or incorrect pattern. The load was only 
applied during the initial response stage and not during the subsequent final response stage in which 
participants were allowed to deliberate (see further). 
 
Procedure 
Reading pretest. Before we ran the main study we recruited an independent convenience sample of 6 
participants for a reading pretest (2 female, Mean age = 34.7 years, SD = 13.1 years). The basic goal of the 
reading pretest was to determine the response deadline which could be applied in the main DG study. The 
idea was to base the response deadline on the average reading time in the reading test (e.g., Bago & De Neys, 
2017). The rationale was that if people are allotted the time they need to simply read the problem, we can 
expect that any further deliberate reasoning will be minimized (Bago & De Neys, 2017, 2019). Thus, in the 
reading pretest participants were presented with the same items as in the main DG. They were instructed to 
simply read the problems and randomly click on one of the answer options (see Supplementary Material A for 
literal instructions).   
Each of the 16 problems was presented to the participants. Before each trial, a fixation cross was 
presented for one second. Once participants clicked on one of the response options, they were automatically 
taken to the next trial. 
The average reading time was M = 3.4 s (SD = 1.7). Note that raw reaction time (RT) data were first 
logarithmically transformed prior to analysis. Mean and standard deviation were calculated on the 
transformed data, and then they were back-transformed into seconds (geometrical mean and SD). We wanted 
to give the participants some minimal leeway, thus we rounded the average reading time to the closest higher 




One-response (deliberative-only) pretest. We also ran a traditional “one-response” version of our Dictator 
game (without deadline or load). The same material as in the main two-response study was used. The only 
difference was that as in traditional economic game studies, participants were simply asked to give one single 
answer for which they could take all the time they wanted. We recruited an independent sample of 82 
participants (61 female, Mean age = 22.4 years, SD = 3.1 years) from the Eotvos Lorand University of 
Budapest who received course credit and a possible monetary bonus payment depending on the game 
outcome. A total of 86.6% of the participants reported high school as highest completed educational level, 
while 13.4% reported having a postsecondary education degree.  
 The one-response version allowed us to check for a possible consistency confound in the two-
response paradigm. When people are asked to give two consecutive responses, they might be influenced by a 
desire to look consistent. Thereby, the paradigm might underestimate the correction rate. Previous two-
response work in other fields already argued against such a confound (De Neys & Bago, 2017, 2019; 
Thompson et al., 2011). Here we tested for it by contrasting the proportion of selfish responses on the 
standard trials in the one-response pretest and the final two-response stage in the main study. A consistency 
confound would result in a clear discrepancy. However, results showed that the rates in the one-response 
(43.4%, SD = 49.6) and final two-response stage were very similar (50.4%, SD = 50, see also Table S1). A 
mixed-effect logistic regression model (accounting for the random intercept of participants and items) 
indicated that the difference was not significant, χ2 (1) = 1.7, p = 0.19, b = 0.65. 
We also contrasted response latencies in the one-response pretest and main two-response study to 
check whether participants were under time-pressure when giving their initial response in the main study. 
Raw reaction time (RT) data were first logarithmically transformed prior to analysis (and again back-
transformed into s afterwards). We focused on the critical standard trials. Results confirmed that participants 
responded faster in the initial two-response stage (Mean = 2.02 s, SD = 2.15) than in the unrestricted one-
response condition (Mean = 2.53, SD = 1.86). A mixed-effect linear regression model (accounting for the 
random intercept of participants and items) indicated that the difference was significant, χ2 (1) = 9.79, p < 
0.0001, b = -0.07.  
 
Two-response Dictator Game. The experiment was run online. Participants were specifically instructed at 
the beginning that we were interested in their very first, initial answer that came to mind. They were also told 
that they would have additional time afterwards to reflect on the problem and could take as much time as 
they needed to provide a final answer. After this general introduction, participants were presented with a 
more specific instruction page which explained them the upcoming game. Participants were informed that the 
game was incentivized and anonymous. Participants were told that each game was played with a different 
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anonymous person and that their identity would never be revealed (see Supplementary Material A for full 
instructions and pay-out structure). 
After the specific instruction page, participants were presented with an attention check.  They saw a 
hypothetical trial on screen and were asked to enter how many points they and the other player would make 
when they chose option A or B. Right amounts could be simply copied from the screen information. If a 
mistake was made, a second, similar attention check was given. If the second attention check was failed, the 
study immediately ended. After the attention check, participants started a practice session to familiarize them 
with the experimental procedure. First, they were presented with two practice DG trials in which they simply 
had to respond before the deadline.  Next, they solved two practice dot matrix load problems (without 
concurrent DG). Finally, at the end of the practice, they had to solve the one earlier practice game and a new 
one under cognitive load just as in the main study. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the full trial structure. Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross 
for 1 s followed by the load matrix that stayed on the screen for 2 s. Next, the Dictator proposal choice 
appeared. From this point onward participants had 4 s to enter their answer; after 3 s the background of the 
screen turned yellow to warn participants about the upcoming deadline. If they did not provide an answer 
before the deadline, they were asked to pay attention to provide an answer within the deadline on subsequent 
trials. After the initial response, participants were asked to rate their experienced decision difficulty (“How hard 
did you find it to make a decision? Please type a number from 0 (absolutely not hard) to 100 (very hard)”). Next, they were 
presented with four matrix pattern options, from which they had to choose the correct, to-be-memorized 
pattern. If the answer was not correct, they were asked to pay more attention to memorize the correct pattern 
on subsequent trials. Finally, the full problem was presented again, and participants were asked to provide a 
final response. After the response was entered, participants again rated the experienced difficulty.  
The colour of the answer options was green during the first response, and blue during the final 
response phase, to visually remind participants which question they were answering. Therefore, right under 
the question we also presented a reminder sentence: “Please indicate your very first, intuitive answer!” and 
“Please give your final answer”, respectively, which was also coloured as the answer options. At the end of 
the study participants completed a page with standard demographic questions. As in Rand et al. (2012), at this 
point, we also asked about their prior experience participating in similar economic game studies. 
 
Exclusion criteria.  All participants passed the attention check questions. Participants failed to provide a 
first response before the deadline in 1.4% of the trials. In addition, in 8.4% of the trials participants 
responded incorrectly to the dot memorization load task. All these trials were removed from the analysis 
because it cannot be guaranteed that the initial response resulted from intuitive processing: If participants 
took longer than the deadline or neglected the load task, they might have engaged in deliberation. Removing 
trials that did not meet the inclusion criteria gives us the purest possible test of our hypothesis. In total, 9.6% 
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of trials were excluded and 1620 trials (out of 1792) were further analysed (initial and final response for the 
same item counted as 1 trial).  
 
Statistical analysis and Confidence Intervals (CI). Unless otherwise noticed, throughout the article we used 
mixed-effect regression models to analyze our results (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008), accounting for the 
random intercept of participants and items. For this, we used the lme4 package (Bates, Sarkar, Bates, & 
Matrix, 2007) in R (R Core Team, 2018). For binary choice data, we used logistic regression while for 
continuous data (RT and confidence) we used linear regression. When we had singular fit issues, the random 
intercept of items was excluded (these tests are shown with an * next to them).  
CIs were computed using the DescTools package in R (Signorell, 2016). For binomial distributions 
(correction indexes, see further) we used the default “Wilson” confidence interval (Brown, Cai, & DasGupta, 
2001) and for multinomial distributions (initial-to-final SS, PP, SP, PS averages, see further) we used the 
default “Sison-Glaz” approach (Sison & Glaz, 1995). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 Given that there are two response stages and two possible choices (selfish or prosocial) there are four 
possible combinations in which a subject can change their answer or not (initial and final selfish, SS; initial 
and final prosocial, PP; Initial selfish and final prosocial, SP; initial prosocial and final selfish, PS). Figure 2A 
plots an overview of the Study 1 results for the critical standard trials (see Table S2 for table format).  It will 
be clear that we find evidence for corrective selfish (PS, 7.6% of total) and prosocial (SP, 8.8% of total) 
responses in which an initial choice is changed after deliberation in the final response stage.  In and of itself, 
this indicates that deliberate correction exists. However, the problem is that these corrective cases are 
relatively rare. As Figure 2A indicates, it is far more likely that one’s final selfish (SS, 42.8%) or prosocial (PP, 
39.6%) choice was already selected in the initial response stage. Hence, both selfish and prosocial choices are 
typically already made intuitively in the absence of any deliberation. To quantify this, the last two bars in 
Figure 2A present the correction indexes (selfish correction index, CorS = the proportion of corrective selfish 
trials (PS), out of all final selfish choice trials (PS+SS); and the prosocial correction index, CorP = the 
proportion of corrective prosocial trials (SP) out of all final prosocial choice trials (SP+PP)). If the deliberate 
correction model is appropriate, this ratio should be at ceiling—or at the very least be above 50% and 
account for the majority of cases. Indeed, a low absolute proportion of PS or SP trials is not necessarily 
problematic for the corrective model. The key prediction is that in case the alleged (demanding) deliberate 
choice is made, it should only be made as final response. It is this critical ratio that is captured by the 
correction indexes.  
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 However, as Figure 2A indicates, the selfish and prosocial correction indexes were far from ceiling or 
even the 50% mark (average CorS = 15.1%; average CorP = 20.2%). To test this statistically, for the selfish 
correction rate, we recoded SS trials as 0 and PS trials as 1. Then we excluded all PP and SP trials and 
calculated the average (which is equal to the CorS rate) and 95% CI. We used mixed-effect linear regression 
models to test whether the average of this variable differed from 50%. For the prosocial correction rate we 
coded PP as 0 and SP as 1, excluded all SS and SP trials, and applied the same statistics. Results showed that 
both the CorS, b = -2.43, p < 0.0001* and CorP, b = -1.67, p < 0.0001, indexes were significantly below 50%.  
 A critic might argue that the strong cognitive constraints at the initial response stage led people to 
make random first responses. Such guessing could overestimate the true initial selfish/prosocial response rate 
and drive the correction rate down.  To test for such a general confound, half of the trials in our game were 
control trials in which there was no conflict between the selfish and prosocial choice. This was achieved by 
varying the pay-off structure such that a prosocial decision also maximized personal payoff. If people refrain 
from blind guessing, one expects a non-random preference for the prosocial/selfish choice on these control 
problems. Results showed that this was indeed the case. In Study 1, the selection rate of the selfish/prosocial 
response option (i.e., the fair split) in the control trials reached 77% (SD = 50%, see also Table S1) which 
significantly differed from chance, b = -2.19, p < 0.0001. We also calculated a stability index on the standard 
trials: For each participant, we calculated on how many standard trials they showed the same direction of 
change pattern (i.e., SS, PP, SP, or PS). The average stability in Study 1 was 76.3% (SD = 23.1) which was 
significantly higher than 50% chance, t (111) = 12.06, p < 0.0001 (in all our studies we used a one-sample, 
one-sided t-test for the stability analysis). This response consistency further indicates that participants were 
not giving random responses. 
 In sum, the Study 1 Dictator Game findings directly argue against the corrective deliberation model. 
In the vast majority of cases participants arrived at their selfish (prosocial) answer without any deliberation. In 
Study 2 we tested the generality of the findings with a two-response version of the Ultimatum Game.    
 





 101 Hungarian students (77 female, Mean age = 21.1 years, SD = 1.8 years) from the Eotvos Lorand 
University of Budapest were tested. A total of 85.7% of participants reported high school as the highest 
completed educational level, while 14.3% reported having a postsecondary education degree. Participants 





Ultimatum Game (UG). Participants were presented with 16 UG trials (8 standard and 8 control, see 
further). The procedure was based on the work of Sanfey and colleagues (Sanfey et al., 2003; Van’t Wout, 
Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2006).  Participants played the role of responder (second-mover). In every trial, 
participants were faced with an offer made by a new, anonymous proposer to split an allocated sum of 10 
points (points were later converted to HUF at a rate of 1 point = 10 HUF, approximately $0.035). If 
participants accepted the offer, both players received the proposed amount. If they refused, neither player 
received anything. The item format looked as follows: 
 
You received the following offer: 
Player "A" keeps 9, and you get 1. 
 





We presented 8 standard and 8 control trials in random order. In the standard trials the participant 
was presented with an unfair offer in which the proposer kept the larger part (9:1, 8:2, 7:3, and 6:4). 
Participants were presented every unfair offer twice. In the control trials the proposer always offered a fair 
(5:5) split. In all trials, participants always maximized their self-interest by accepting the offer. In the standard 
trials participants could make a prosocial choice and pay a personal cost to punish the other’s player selfish 
behaviour by rejecting the offer (Rand et al., 2012). In control trials, the other player did not behave selfishly 
so there was no prosocial motivation to punish the other and reject the offer. Hence, a high rate of accepted 
control offers can be expected (Sanfey et al., 2003). For convenience, we will refer to accepted control trials 
as “selfish” responses.  
 
Procedure 
Reading pretest. Before we ran the main study we recruited an independent sample of 28 participants 
for a reading pretest (20 female, Mean age = 21.8 years, SD = 4.2 years) following the same procedure and 
logic as in Study 1. Each of the 16 UG items was presented to the participants. They were asked to simply 
read the sentences and click on one of the answers to advance to the next item.  
The average reading time was 3.3 s (SD = 1.8). Note that raw RT data were first logarithmically 
transformed prior to analysis. Mean and standard deviation was calculated on the transformed data, and then 
they were back-transformed into seconds (geometrical mean and SD). In Study 1, results showed that on 
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average participants managed to give a response in the initial response stage well before the 4 s deadline. 
Therefore, in Study 2 we decided to round the reading time down to the lower integer and set the response 
deadline to 3 s.  
 
One-response (deliberative-only) pretest. Following the same logic as in Study 1, we also ran a one-response 
pretest of the Ultimatum Game. We recruited an independent sample of 58 participants (44 female, Mean age 
=  21.5 years, SD = 2.5 years) from the Eotvos Lorand University of Budapest who received course credit 
and a possible monetary bonus payment depending on the game outcome. A total of 89.7% of the 
participants reported high school as highest completed educational level, while 10.3% reported having a 
postsecondary education degree.  
 We again observed a fairly similar rate of selfish choices on standard trials in the one-response pretest 
(39%, SD = 48.8) and the final stage of the main two-response study 41.9% (SD = 42.4), χ2(1) = 0.07, p = 
0.79, b = 0.14. Latency analysis indicated that participants responded faster on standard trials in the initial 
two-response stage (Mean = 1.87 s, SD = 1.29) than in the unrestricted one-response condition (Mean = 2.74 
s, SD = 1.84), χ2(1) = 153.56 p < 0.0001, b = -0.29. 
 
Two-response paradigm. As in Study 1, participants were specifically instructed at the beginning that we 
were interested in their very first, initial answer that came to mind. They were also told that they would have 
additional time afterwards to reflect on the problem and could take as much time as they needed to provide a 
final answer. After the general two-response introduction (see Study 1), participants were presented with a 
more specific instruction page which explained them the upcoming game. Participants were informed that the 
game was incentivized and anonymous (see Supplementary Material A for full instructions and pay-out 
structure). The remainder of the two-response procedure was similar to Study 1. After the specific instruction 
page, participants were presented with an attention check, familiarized with the deadline and load procedure, 
and started the game. The only difference was that the initial response deadline was set to 3 s in the UG.  
 
Exclusion criteria.  Three participants failed the introductory attention check questions and could not 
participate further. The remaining participants failed to provide a first response before the deadline in 2.6% 
of the trials. In addition, in 8.6% of the trials participants responded incorrectly to the dot memorization load 




 Figure 2B and Table S2 show the results. We report an overview of the statistical analyses here. See 
Study 1 results for background.  
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 As Figure 2B indicates, selfish (PS, 8.9%) and prosocial (SP, 5.5% deliberate correction was rare and 
the corresponding correction indexes were low. Our statistical analysis confirmed that the selfish, 21.2%, b = 
-1.57, p = 0.006, and prosocial, 9.4%, b = -2.6,  p < 0.0001, correction index rate for the standard UG were 
significantly lower than 50%.  
 The selection rate of the selfish/prosocial response option (i.e., accepting the fair split) in the control 
trials was 95.3% (SD = 21.2%) which significantly differed from chance, b = 10.52, p < 0.0001*. The average 
standard trial stability in Study 2 was 74.8% (SD = 21.5) which was significantly higher than 50% chance, t 
(97) = 11.43, p < 0.0001. 
 Study 2 showed that deliberate correction in the Ultimatum Game was the exception rather than the 
rule. As in Study 1, correction indexes were low and people typically arrived at their selfish (prosocial) answer 
without deliberation. In Study 3, we further tested the generality of the findings with a two-response version 
of a two-player Public Good Game. 
 





 95 Hungarian students (58 female, Mean age = 21.2 years, SD = 1.95 years) from the Eotvos Lorand 
University of Budapest were tested. A total of 86.6% of participants reported high school as the highest 
completed educational level, while 13.4% reported having a postsecondary education degree. Participants 
received course credit in return for participation and a possible monetary bonus payment. 
 
Materials 
Public Good Game (PG). Participants played 16 PG trials (8 standard and 8 control trials). In each trial, 
participants were randomly paired with another, anonymous participant. In each trial participants were given 
100 points and were told that they could both decide to contribute this allocation to a common pool or not. 
They were informed that the number of points in the common pool would be multiplied by a factor 1.2 to 2.9 
and that the resulting total points would be equally split between the two participants. In each trial 
participants were presented with the actual pay-off matrix on screen. For example: 
 
 Player B contributes Player B doesn't contribute 
You contribute 120 / 120   60 / 160  
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You don't contribute 160 / 60 100 / 100 
 
 
Do you contribute to the common pool? 
 
a) Yes  
b) No 
 
 The participants’ pay-off was shown in black, the other players’ pay-off in grey.  The order of the 
matrix rows (and response options) was counterbalanced; for half of the participants the top row (“You 
contribute”) stated the pay-offs in case they contributed, for the other half the top row stated the pay-offs in 
case of non-contribution. Response options were ordered similarly (e.g., if first row stated contribution pay-
off, the upper response option stated “Yes”).  
 We presented 8 standard and 8 control trials. In standard trials we multiplied the number of points 
with a multiplier between 1.2 and 1.9. In these trials, self-interest is maximized by not contributing whereas 
the group pay-off is maximized by contributing. Hence, selfish considerations cue a “No” decision, whereas 
prosocial considerations cue a “Yes” decision. In control trials, we selected multipliers between 2.2 and 2.9. 
In these trials, contributing always yields a higher pay-off compared to non-contribution both for oneself and 
for the group. Hence, both selfish and prosocial motivations cue the same “Yes” response. Consequently, a 
high, non-random proportion of “Yes” responses is expected on the control trials. For convenience, we label 
such “Yes” control responses as “selfish” choices.  
 
Procedure 
Reading pretest. Before we ran the main study we recruited an independent sample of 28 participants 
for a reading pretest (20 female, Mean age = 21.3 years, SD = 2.3 years) following the same procedure and 
logic as in Study 1-2. Each of the 16 PG items was presented to the participants. They were asked to simply 
read the information and click on one of the answers to advance to the next item.  
The average reading was 6.1 s (SD = 2.5). Note that raw reaction time (RT) data were first 
logarithmically transformed prior to analysis. Mean and standard deviation were calculated on the 
transformed data and back-transformed into seconds. Following the logic of Study 2, we rounded the average 
reading time to the closest lower natural number; the response deadline was therefore set to 6 s. 
 
One-response (deliberative-only) pretest. Following the same logic as in Study 1-2, we also ran a one-
response pretest of our Public Good Game. We recruited an independent sample of 65 participants (48 
female, Mean age = 21.5 years, SD = 2 years) from the Eotvos Lorand University of Budapest who received 
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course credit and a possible monetary bonus payment depending on the game outcome. No specific 
education level information was recorded but the participants came from the same university sample as the 
ones in the main study. 
 We again observed a fairly similar mean rate of selfish choices on standard trials in the one-response 
pretest (70.6%, SD = 45.6%) and the final stage of the main two-response study (66.2%, SD = 47.3%), χ2 (1) 
= 0.04, p = 0.84, b = -0.1. Latency analysis indicated that participants responded faster on standard trials in 
the initial two-response stage (Mean = 2.94 s, SD = 1.5) than in the unrestricted one-response condition 
(Mean = 6.92 s, SD = 2.25), χ2 (1) = 96.93, p < 0.0001, b = -0.37. 
 
Two-response paradigm. As in Study 1-2, participants were specifically instructed at the beginning that 
we were interested in their very first, initial answer that came to mind. They were also told that they would 
have additional time afterwards to reflect on the problem and could take as much time as they needed to 
provide a final answer. After the general two-response introduction (see Study 1), participants were presented 
with a more specific instruction page which explained them the upcoming game. Participants were informed 
that the game was incentivized and anonymous (see Supplementary Material A for full instructions and pay-
out structure). 
The remainder of the two-response procedure was similar to Study 1. After the specific instruction 
page, participants were presented with an attention check, familiarized with the deadline and load procedure, 
and started the game. The only difference was that the initial response deadline was set to 6 s in the PG.  
 
Exclusion criteria.  Three participants failed the introductory attention check questions and could not 
participate further. The remaining participants failed to provide a first response before the deadline in 1.7% 
of the trials. In addition, in 8.7% of the trials participants responded incorrectly to the dot memorization load 




 Figure 2C and Table S2 show the results. As Figure 2C indicates, selfish (PS, 10.6%) and prosocial 
(SP, 6.1%) deliberate correction was rare and the corresponding correction indexes were low. The selfish, 
16%, b = -2.2, p < 0.0001*, and prosocial, 18.2%, b = -2.06,  p < 0.0001*,  correction indexes in the standard 
PGG trials were significantly lower than 50%.  
 The selection rate of the selfish/prosocial response option (i.e., “Yes” responses) in the control trials 
was 86% (SD = 34.7) which significantly differed from chance, b = 10.5, p < 0.0001*. The average standard 




 In sum, the Study 3 Public Goods Game findings were consistent with the results we obtained for 
the Dictator Game (Study 2) and Ultimatum Game (Study 2) and showed that prosocial and selfish responses 
are typically driven by intuitive processing rather than deliberate correction.  
 In Study 4-7 we addressed various alternative explanations and possible experimental confounds. 
One might note that although the two-response paradigm allows participants to deliberate in the final 
response stage, this does not guarantee they actually do so. This is also a common issue for previous studies 
that only use a single (one-response), deliberative stage. A common solution when examining the impact of 
deliberation on prosocial choice is to force people to think for at least 10 s before they can enter a response 
(Rand et al., 2012).  Therefore, in Study 4 participants played the same Dictator Game as in Study 1 but with 
forced deliberation in the final response stage.  
 





 112 Hungarian students (79 female, Mean age = 22.13 years, SD = 2.4 years) from the Eotvos 
Lorand University of Budapest were tested. A total of 89.2% of participants reported high school as the 
highest completed educational level, while 10.8% reported having a postsecondary education degree. 
Participants received course credit in return for participation and a possible monetary bonus payment. 
 
Materials & Procedure 
 
Delayed final response. We used the same DG trials with the same two-response paradigm as in Study 1. 
The only change we made was the forced deliberation at the final response stage. Participants were instructed 
to reflect for at least 10 s in the final response stage and could not enter a response before 10 s had passed 
(see Supplementary Material A for full instructions). 
 
Exclusion criteria. One participant failed the introductory attention check questions and could not 
participate further. The remaining participants failed to provide a first response before the deadline in 2.9% 
of the trials. In addition, in 10.3% of the trials participants responded incorrectly to the dot memorization 







 Figure 2D and Table S2 show the results. As Figure 2 indicates, despite the forced deliberation in 
Study 4 results were similar to Study 1. Deliberate correction remained the rare exception. The statistical 
analysis confirmed that the selfish, 11.7%, b = -2.64, p < 0.0001, and prosocial, 20.2%, b = -2.51, p < 0.0001*, 
correction index rates on the standard trials were significantly lower than 50% in Study 4.  
 With respect to guessing, the selection rate of the selfish/prosocial response option in the control 
trials was 81.2% (SD = 39.1%) which significantly differed from chance, b = 2.85, p < 0.0001*. The average 
standard trial stability in Study 4 was 80.3% (SD = 21.7) which was significantly higher than 50% chance, t 
(110) = 14.73, p < 0.0001. 
 In sum, Study 4 confirmed the Study 1 results. In study 5-7 we further refined the methodology.  
Although our instructions, load, and time-pressure manipulations were based on established procedures, one 
could argue that they were not demanding enough and still allowed participants to deliberate during the initial 
response stage (Kessler et al., 2017; Krawczyk & Sylwestrzak, 2018). Therefore, we tuned up our 
manipulations in Study 5-7. In addition to the forced deliberation we also used more stringent response 
deadlines and more extreme load. In Study 1-4 participants memorized a 4-dot pattern in a 3x3 grid while 
making their initial game choices whereas this was increased to a 5-dot pattern in a 4x4 grid in study 5-7. In 
addition, the response deadline for each of the games in Study 5-7 was set at the average initial response time 
observed in Study 1-4.  
 






119 participants were recruited (56 female, Mean age = 32.5 years, SD = 10.7 years) on Prolific 
Academic. Only native English speakers from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States of America 
or the United Kingdom were allowed to take part in the study. Among them 47.1% reported high school as 
the highest completed educational level, while 52.1% reported having a postsecondary education degree. 
Participants received a participation fee (£5/hour) and a possible bonus payment depending on the game 
outcome.  
Because we expected a higher number of excluded trials in the extreme deadline/load treatment we 
recruited a slightly higher number of participants in Study 5-7. For each study the goal was to get at 




Materials & Procedure 
Delayed final response. The exact same Dictator Game with forced deliberation procedure as in Study 4 
was used.  
 
Extreme load. In Studies 1–4, participants had to memorize a complex four-dot pattern in a 3 x 3 grid 
during the initial response stage. In Study 5 we presented an even more complex five-dot pattern in a 4 x 4 
grid (e.g., Białek & De Neys, 2017; Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014, see Figure 1 and S1). Except for the 
precise load pattern, the load procedure was similar to Study 1–4.   
 
Response deadline. In Study 1 and 4 the response deadline for the initial DG response was 4 s and the 
average initial response latency on standard trials was 2.02 s (SD = 2.15). In Study 5 we decreased the 
deadline to this average (rounded to nearest integer) and set it to 2 s.  The screen background turned yellow 
to alert the participant to enter their response 500 ms before the deadline.  
 
 Difficulty rating. In Study 1-4 participants were asked to indicate how hard they found it to make a 
decision after each response. In Study 5-7 this difficulty rating was dropped.  
 
Exclusion criteria. All participants passed the introductory attention check questions. Participants failed to 
provide a first response before the deadline in 8.9% of the trials. In addition, in 14.6% of the trials 
participants responded incorrectly to the dot memorization load task. All missed deadline and load trials were 
excluded (21% of trials; 1505 trials out of 1904 were analysed). Note that—consistent with the stronger 




 Figure 2E and Table S2 show the Study 5 results. As Figure 2 indicates, despite the stronger 
constraints, results were similar to Study 1 and 4. Deliberate correction remained exceptional and never 
became the dominant pattern. Statistical testing indicated that the selfish, 8.3%, b = -3.18, p < 0.0001*, and 
prosocial, 27.7%, b = -1.32, p < 0.0001*, correction index rates were significantly lower than 50%.  
 Given the stronger cognitive constraints in Study 5 it is important to check for a possible random 
responding or guessing confound. However, the selection rate of the selfish/prosocial response option in the 
control trials reached 86.6% (SD = 34.1) which significantly differed from chance, b = 3.15, p < 0.0001. The 
average standard trial stability in Study 5 was 83.2% (SD = 20.03) which was significantly higher than 50% 
chance, t (117) = 17.996, p < 0.0001. This establishes that despite the stronger constraints, participants were 
not responding randomly.  
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 The Study 5 Dictator Game findings are consistent with the Study 1 and 4 Dictator Game results. In 
Study 6 we adopted the same strong constraints as in Study 5 with the Ultimatum Game.  
 






126 participants (55 female, Mean age = 33.8 years, SD = 10.4 years) were recruited on Prolific 
Academic. Only native English speakers from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States of America 
or the United Kingdom were allowed to take part in the study. 35.3% of participants reported high school as 
the highest completed educational level, while 63.8% reported having a postsecondary education degree. 
Participants received a participation fee (£5/hour) and a possible bonus payment depending on the game 
outcome.  
 
Materials & Procedure 
Delayed final response. We used the same ultimatum game trials as in Study 2. The delayed response 
procedure was completely similar to the one adopted in Study 4-5.  
 
Extreme load. We used the same extreme load task as described in Study 5. 
 
Response deadline. In Study 2 the response deadline for the initial DG response was 3 s and the average 
initial response latency on standard trials was 1.87 s (SD = 1.29). In Study 6 we decreased the deadline to this 
average (rounded to nearest integer) and set it to 2 s.  The screen background turned yellow to alert the 
participant to enter their response 500 ms before the deadline.  
 
Exclusion criteria. Five participants failed the introductory attention check questions and could not 
participate further. The remaining participants failed to provide a first response before the deadline in 14.6% 
of the trials. In addition, in 17.7% of the trials participants responded incorrectly to the memorization load 






 Figure 2F and Table S2 show the Study 6 results. As Figure 2 indicates, despite the stronger 
constraints, key results were similar to Study 2. Deliberate correction remained exceptional and never became 
the dominant pattern. The selfish, 6.3%, b = -10.87, p < 0.0001, and prosocial, 23.1%, b = -1.96, p < 0.0001*, 
correction index rates on the standard trials were both significantly lower than 50%.  
 The selection rate of the selfish/prosocial response option in the control trials reached 96.7% (SD = 
17.9) which significantly differed from chance, b = 8.72, p < 0.0001*. The average standard trial stability in 
Study 6 was 78.1% (SD = 20.8) which was significantly higher than 50% chance, t (113) = 14.43, p < 0.0001. 
This again indicates that the stronger cognitive constraints did not underestimate the correction indexes by 
prompting a random response tendency.  
 Study 6 confirmed our previous findings. In the final Study 7 we also tested the Public Good Game 
with the strong constraints that we adopted in Study 5-6.  
 





131 participants (63 female, Mean age = 30.3 years, SD = 10.5 years) were recruited on Prolific 
Academic. Only native English speakers from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States of America 
or the United Kingdom were allowed to take part in the study. 47.3% of participants reported high school as 
the highest completed educational level, while 50% reported having a postsecondary education degree. 
Participants received a participation fee (£5/hour) and a possible bonus payment depending on the game 
outcome.  
 
Materials & Procedure 
Delayed final response. We used the same Public Good Game trials as in Study 3. The delayed response 
procedure was completely similar to the one adopted in Study 4-6.  
 
Extreme load. We used the same extreme load task as described in Study 5-6. 
 
Response deadline. In Study 3 the response deadline for the initial PG response was 6 s and the average 
initial response latency on standard trials was 2.94 s (SD = 1.5). Consistent with the Study 5-6 rationale, in 
Study 7 we decreased the deadline to this average (rounded to nearest integer) and set it to 3 s.  The screen 




Exclusion criteria. 19 participants failed the introductory attention check questions and could not 
participate further. The remaining participants failed to provide a first response before the deadline in 11.5% 
of the trials. In addition, in 13.8% of the trials participants responded incorrectly to the dot memorization 





 Figure 2G and Table S2 show the Study 7 results. As Figure 2 indicates, despite the stronger 
constraints, critical findings are consistent with our Public Good Game findings in Study 3 and our other 
studies. The correction indexes indicate that deliberate correction never became the dominant pattern.  The 
statistical analysis confirmed that both the selfish, 25.2%, b = -1.73, p < 0.0001, and prosocial, 25.2%, b = -
1.26, p = 0.002, correction index rate on the standard trials were significantly lower than 50%.  
 The selection rate of the selfish/prosocial response option in the control trials in Study 7 was 85.6% 
(SD = 35.1) which significantly differed from chance, b = 3.06, p < 0.0001. The average standard trial stability 
was 72.2% (SD = 20.8) which was significantly higher than 50% chance, t (111) = 11.67, p < 0.0001. This 
again indicates that participants were not responding randomly.  
 Our results were very similar in the different studies that we ran. For convenience, we also ran an 
analysis on the combined Study 1-7 data. These results are show in Figure 2H (see Supplementary Material B 




The present study tested the corrective dual process model of prosocial behavior. This influential model 
entails that intuition will favor one type of behavior whereas making the competing choice will require slow, 
deliberate processing to control and correct the initial intuitive impulse. Pace the deliberate correction 
prediction, in each of our seven studies we consistently observed that both prosocial and selfish responses 
were predominantly made intuitively rather than after deliberate correction.  Although corrective patterns 
were observed, they were the rare exception rather than the rule.  In general, it seems that the corrective dual 
process model—and the deliberate prosociality and deliberate selfishness views that are built on it—has given 
too much weight to deliberation. Making prosocial and selfish choices does not typically rely on different 
types of reasoning systems (i.e., an intuitive “System 1” and deliberate “System 2” or an impulsive and 
controlled system) but rather on different types of intuitions. 
 Clearly, the conclusion only holds in so far as there are no alternative explanations or experimental 
confounds. In the consecutive studies and pretests we controlled for various possible issues. We summarize 
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the key points here and discuss some additional control analyses. First, the cognitive constraints at the first 
stage of the two-response paradigm might have led people to make random first responses, which would lead 
to an underestimation of the frequency and systematicity of their corrections. However, our “control” trials 
(on which prosocial decisions also maximized personal payoff) and stability analysis consistently indicated 
that responses at the intuitive stage were not random.  
 Second, the two-response paradigm might introduce experimental demands for consistency or an 
anchoring effect that would artificially reduce the rate at which participants correct their decisions. To rule 
out this concern, Studies 1–3 included an additional “one-response” pretest in which participants only gave 
deliberate responses, skipping the first intuitive stage. Results showed that choices in the final two-response 
stage and pretest were very consistent.  For none of the games, choices differed by more than 7%. Hence, a 
possible consistency confound cannot explain the very low correction rates.  
 Third, the two-response paradigm allows people to deliberate in the final response stage but does not 
guarantee they actually do so. Since previous studies that examined the impact of deliberation on prosocial 
choice often forced people to think for at least 10 s before they could enter a response, Studies 4-7 adopted 
this forced deliberation in the final response stage. However, even with forced deliberation, the correction 
rates remained floored.  
 Fourth, even if our instructions, time pressure and cognitive load manipulations had all been largely 
validated by previous research, it is still possible that they were not demanding enough, and thus allowed 
participants to engage in deliberation at the first, intuitive stage. To rule out this concern, we used more 
extreme load and time pressure manipulations in Study 5-7. Deliberate correction remained infrequent and 
never became the modal pattern. 
 Fifth, contrasting of the unrestricted one-response pretests latencies in Study 1-3 and the 
corresponding initial two-response latencies also established that even in our least restrictive two-response 
studies 1-3, participants were under time pressure. In addition, we also ran an extra control analysis in which 
we contrasted the correction index rate for fast and slow initial responses (based on a median split on initial 
response time in each of the studies). If our deadlines were not stringent enough and allowed (some) 
participants to engage in deliberation in the initial response stage, one expects that the correction rate should 
be higher for fast vs slow initial responses (since slow responders had more time to engage in possible 
preemptive deliberation). Results showed this was not the case (see supplementary Material B, Table S2-S4). 
Even for the fastest half of responses, the correction rate remained floored. 
 Sixth, the literature has pointed to possible moderators of the prevalence of selfish/prosocial choice 
such as gender and experience in participating in economic games (McAuliffe, Forster, Pedersen, & 
McCullough, 2018; Rand, 2016; Rand, Brescoll, Everett, Capraro, & Barcelo, 2016; Rand et al., 2012). In 
additional control tests we also analyzed results separately for both genders (Table S5-S6) and for subjects 
who indicated they had previously participated in economic game studies or not (Table S7-S8). Given that 
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participants played multiple one-shot games in each study we also ran an analysis on their first game trial only 
(Table S9) to sidestep a possible repeated testing confound (McAuliffe et al. 2018). However, none of these 
factors altered the conclusions. For none of the control analyses there was a single study in which deliberate 
correction became the modal pattern. Irrespective of gender and experience, selfish and prosocial choices 
were predominantly made intuitively.  
 Seventh, we always discarded from analyses the trials in which participants failed to comply with the 
deadline or failed their memorization task. This eliminates the possibility that participants neglected and 
traded-off the time-pressure or load task to deliberate during the initial game choice. However, although the 
number of discarded trials was acceptable (overall 12% of all trials), in theory, this might lead to a selection 
confound (Bouwmeester et al., 2017). Table S10 shows the data without application of the load exclusion 
criterion (missed deadline trials were not recorded). Results were fully consistent with the original analyses. 
 In sum, our results show strong evidence that deliberation has a very limited impact on prosocial 
decisions. Both prosocial and selfish choices are typically generated intuitively and rarely require deliberation. 
Previous research already established that different individuals have different yet stable inclinations to make 
prosocial decisions in the economic games we used in this article, at least when they only know about the 
payoffs of the game (and not, e.g., about the other player). Different labels exist for one's inclination to be 
prosocial in this context, for example, one's social value orientation (Murphy & Ackermann, 2014), 
cooperative phenotype (Peysakhovich, Nowak, & Rand, 2014), or other-regarding preferences (Cooper & 
Kagel, 2016). When people express their orientations, phenotypes, or preferences in the context of economic 
games, they may rely either on intuitive or deliberate processing. Dual-process models typically assume that 
the people who deliberate have an opportunity to correct their intuitive response, in a systematic direction. 
Our results suggest that few people take advantage of this opportunity, and that their corrections do not 
follow a systematic pattern. Accordingly, social value orientations, cooperative phenotypes and other-
regarding preferences are likely to largely reflect peoples' intuitive reactions, rather than deliberate corrections. 
By and large, the individuals who are intuitively prosocial remain prosocial when they deliberate, and the 
individuals who are intuitively selfish remain selfish when they deliberate.  
 This is not to say that people cannot change their decision through deliberation. In every study, we 
observed instances of deliberate correction. The problem is one of prevalence and impact, not of existence.  
Neither do we argue that deliberation has no possible role in prosocial contexts—for example, it may very 
well allow people to give ex post justifications for their prosocial or selfish decisions (Mercier & Sperber, 
2011). What seems clear, though, is that deliberation plays little role in shaping these decisions. Deliberation 
can also play a role in prosocial games when people receive additional information about the context of the 
game, in addition to its payoffs. For example, people may receive information about the reputation of the 
other player, they may have direct information about the behavior of the other player in the case of repeated 
games, they may be able to exchange messages with the other player, they may be able to see a picture of the 
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other player, and so forth. There are infinite variations on the kind of additional information people may 
access, that may change their decision. Depending on the kind of information, this change may result from 
intuitive processing, or from deliberate processing. Our findings concern the minimal, prototypical setting in 
which people only know about the payoffs of the game, and do not speak to variants in which additional 
information may involve deliberate processing. 
 Some aspects of our data are consistent with specific conjectures about human prosociality. For 
example, based on the Social Heuristic Hypothesis (SHH, Rand et al., 2012, 2014) one might predict that in 
case deliberation alters our intuitive choices in the context of pure cooperation games (as tracked by the 
Public Good Game, but not the Dictator or Ultimatum Game), it will lead to more selfish than prosocial 
choices. Our two Public Good Games studies (Study 3 and 7) indeed showed that prosocial-to-selfish (PS) 
changes were more likely than selfish-to-prosocial (SP) changes (See Figure 2). Hence, this specific aspect of 
the SHH about the direction of deliberate correction is supported by our work. However, the key problem is 
the prevalence of deliberate correction per se. Although deliberate correction—when it occurs— might make 
people more selfish in the Public Good Game, it is far more likely that a selfish Public Good Game decision 
is generated intuitively than that it follows from deliberation. The point is that the dual process correction 
mechanism is only accounting for a small fraction of our behavior. As such it does not present a viable 
psychological model of prosocial behavior.  
 Interestingly, the low prevalence of deliberate correction was also observed in previous studies on 
prosociality that attempted to track how people changed (or didn’t change) their answer after prolonged 
deliberation (e.g.,  Kessler et al., 2019; Krawczyk & Sylwestrzak, 2018). Although the design of these studies 
did not prevent participants from deliberating when they generated their first answer, the present findings 
validate the observed trends. The low prevalence of deliberate correction can also help to explain some of the 
discrepant findings in the prosociality literature. As we noted, there is a longstanding discussion as to whether 
deliberation promotes prosocial (vs selfish) behavior. Experimental manipulations designed to favor intuitive 
processing in prosocial choice tasks have resulted in mixed results: some studies reported null-findings, some 
support the deliberate selfishness account, and others support the deliberate prosociality account (see 
Capraro, 2019, for a review). Meta-analyses have indicated that if anything, the effect is small (e.g., Rand, 
2017, 2019). For example, Rand (2019) found that experimental manipulations that favored intuition/limited 
deliberation led on average to an increase of 3.1% prosocial cooperative choices. The present findings can 
help to put this in perspective. Deliberate correction clearly exists. However, the prevalence is low and there 
are always corrections in both directions. This implies that any experimental procedure aimed to “knock-out” 
deliberation is bound to have small effects. In the vast majority of cases, people will manage to generate the 
same response intuitively. It is only the small fraction of corrective cases that can be affected.  Hence, small 
effect sizes might not point to a “failed” manipulation but simply reflect the low prevalence of the corrective 
behavior in question. Likewise, given that the base-rate of corrective cases is so low, even minimal individual 
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sample composition variation (i.e., slightly higher SP or PS cases) might result in opposite effects of one’s 
manipulation.  
 As we noted, at the theoretical level the findings suggest that dual-process, fast-and-slow models of 
prosociality have given too much weight to the role of deliberative correction. This fits with recent calls to 
upgrade the view of intuitive reasoning in dual process models (e.g., De Neys, 2017). Just as in the current 
case of prosocial choice, in other fields evidence is also amassing against the deliberate correction view. From 
moral reasoning to logical inferencing, emerging evidence indicates that the response that traditional dual 
process models assume to require deliberation, is often already generated intuitively (e.g., Bago & De Neys, 
2017, 2019; Gürçay & Baron, 2017; Newman, Gibb, & Thompson, 2017; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 
2015; Trippas & Handley, 2017). Newer models posit that fast-and-slow decision making is mostly a conflict 
between fast intuitions, with a limited role for deliberate correction. Under this view, decisions are driven by 
the activation levels of competing intuitions, and deliberate correction only occurs in difficult cases when 
competing intuitions have maximally similar activation levels (e.g., Bago & De Neys, 2017; De Neys & 
Pennycook, 2019). Interestingly, there is some evidence in the current studies that fits with this account. In 
Study 1-4 we asked participants to rate how hard they found it to make a decision. Results showed that for 
the rare trials on which the initial response was subsequently corrected after deliberation, the initial decision 
was experienced as more difficult than for trials that were not changed (Figure S2, Supplementary Material B). 
Although further validation will be required, this framework might present the various psychologists, 
economists, and philosophers interested in human prosociality with a more viable alternative to the traditional 
dual process model. 
  It is perhaps not surprising that the deliberate correction dual process model has attracted the 
attention of various policy makers (e.g., Chater, 2018; Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; 
World Bank, 2015). Clearly, if the model is correct, it holds the promise of steering people’s behavior in one 
direction or the other by simple interventions that prime intuitive vs deliberate processing. But even if such 
interventions are deemed ethically desirable, the present results suggest that they will have overall limited 
impact on people’s prosocial behavior. Given that both prosocial and selfish choices are predominantly 
generated intuitively, stimulating intuition or deliberation per se will not be very effective. Based on the 
current results it seems more promising for policy makers to try to target different types of intuitions rather 
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Figure 1. Overview of study procedures. In each study, each trial featured a different dot matrix 
to be memorized, and different payoffs for the game used in the study. See method sections for a 






   





Figure 2. Overview of study results. Percentage of four possible initial-to-final choice patterns 
and correction indexes. First/second letter refers to initial/final choice. S = Selfish choice. P = 
Prosocial choice. CorS = Selfish correction rate, CorP = Prosocial correction rate. Error bars 









A. Instructions and pay-out structure  
 
Study 1 reading pretest 
 
The literal instructions that were used stated the following (translated from Hungarian): 
 
“In this experiment, your only task will be to read the tasks we will present you. You do not have to think, just read each 
and every sentence in the task. Then, once you finished reading, you can randomly click on one of the two responses. 
We simply would like to know how much time people need to read these tasks. There will be 16 questions, and the 
experiment will take approximately 5 minutes.” 
 
Click on “Next” to start the experiment.” 
 
Study 1 (Dictator Game) main two-response study  
 
The literal instructions that were used stated the following (translated from Hungarian): 
 
“Welcome to the experiment! 
Please read these instructions carefully! 
This experiment is composed of 16 questions and a couple of practice questions. It will take about 12 minutes to 
complete and it demands your full attention. You can only do this experiment once. In this task, we'll present you with a 
set of decision-making problems. We would like you to read every problem carefully and enter your response by clicking 
on it. We want to know what your initial, intuitive decision is and how you respond after you have thought about the 
problem for some more time. Hence, as soon as the problem is presented, we will ask you to enter your initial response. 
We want you to respond with the very first answer that comes to mind. You don't need to think about it. Just give the 
first answer that intuitively comes to mind as quickly as possible. Next, the problem will be presented again and you can 
take all the time you want to actively reflect on it. Once you have made up your mind you can enter your final response. 
You will have as much time as you need to indicate your second response. 
After you have entered your first and final answer we will also ask you to indicate how hard you found it to make a 
decision. 
In sum, keep in mind that it is really crucial that you give your first, initial response as fast as possible. Afterwards, you 
can take as much time as you want to reflect on the problem and select your final response.  
Please confirm below that you read these instructions carefully and then press the "Next" button.” 
 
After this general introduction, participants were presented with a more specific instruction page 
which explained them the upcoming task and informed them about the response deadline. The 
literal instructions were as follows: 
 
“In this experiment, you have the opportunity to earn money up to 300 HUF. During the experiment, you can collect 
points. The points you earn during the experiment will be converted at the following rate: 1 point = 3 HUF. 
 
This experiment will include 16 trials. In every trial, you will make two decisions, and at the end of the experiment we 
randomly choose one of your decisions and you will receive money corresponding to the number of points you earned. 
 
In each trial, we will ask you to play a simple game in which there are always two players (Player 1 and 2). In each trial, 
you are going to play as player 1. In every trial, you are going to be allocated 100 points. Your task will be to divide this 
amount into two parts; you can decide how much points (out of the 100) you want to keep, and how much you want to 
give to the other player. The game is completely anonymous; the other player will never know your identity, neither will 
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you know who you are playing with. The players are randomly assigned to each other; in every trial, you will play with a 
new opponent. 
 
In every trial, you will always have two response options; both of the options state a proposed split-up of the offered 
100 points. For example: 
 
A) You keep 60; the other player gets 40 
B) You keep 30; the other player gets 70 
 
You will have to click on the option you want to go with. Let’s say you go with option A. At the end of the experiment 
we randomly choose one trial out of the 16 you will play. If this was the randomly chosen trial you will receive 60 points 
meaning $0.6, while the other player will receive 40 points; which means $0.4. Keep this in mind, while doing the 
experiment. 
 
All trials and players are real. To assure this, for each participant we will randomly determine at the end of the 
experiment whether they will be paid out as player 1 or player 2. Half of the participants will be paid out as player 1, the 
other half as player 2. If you are paid out as player 1 you receive the money you decided to keep for yourself on one 
randomly chosen decision you made. If you are paid out as player 2, you will be randomly paired with another 
participant and receive the amount they gave to the other player in one of their randomly chosen trials. You will never 
know who the other players were and whether you were paid as player 1 or 2. The computer will randomly pair 
participants and select trials at the end of the experiment. At no point in time will you be informed about the identity of 
another participant. Likewise, the other participants will not be informed about your identity. All payments will be made 
anonymously. That is, the other participants do not learn how much you earned in the experiment. 
 
As we told you we are interested in your initial, intuitive response. First, we want you to respond with the very first 
answer that comes to mind. You don't need to think about it. Just give the first answer that intuitively comes to mind as 
quickly as possible. To assure this, a time limit was set for the first response, which is going to be 4 seconds. When there 
is one a second left, the background colour will turn to yellow to let you know that the deadline is approaching. Please 
make sure to answer before the deadline passes.  Next, the problem will be presented again and you can take all the time 
you want to actively reflect on it. Once you have made up your mind, you can enter your final response for which you 
will have as much time as you need. 
 
Both your initial and final decision will be included in the lottery to determine how much money you and the other 
player will receive. 
 
Press "Next" if you are ready to start the practice session!” 
 
Pay-out structure:  As it is clear from the instructions, the game was incentivized and anonymous. 
All participants played the game as Dictator (Player 1). To determine the pay-out, we randomly 
paired participants and decided who was paid as Player 1 and 2. Then, we randomly selected a 
decision (an initial or final response in one trial) from Player 1 and we paid both players accordingly. 
 
Study 2 (Ultimatum Game) main two-response study  
 
The literal instructions that were used stated the following (translated from Hungarian): 
 
“In this experiment, you have the opportunity to earn money up to 300 HUF. During the experiment, you can collect 
points. The points you earn during the experiment will be converted at the following rate: 1 point = 3 HUF. 
 
This experiment will include 16 trials. In every trial, you will make two decisions, and at the end of the experiment we 
randomly choose one of your decisions and you will receive money corresponding to the number of points you earned.  
In each trial, we will ask you to play a simple game in which there are always two players (Player A and B). In each trial 
you are going to play as player B. In every trial, the person playing Player A is going to be offered 100 points. Player A 
then will be asked to divide this amount between the two of you; he/she is allowed to make any proposal he/she wants. 
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Then, you will be shown Player A’s proposal and you can decide to accept or reject it. If you decide to accept, both of 
you will get the proposed amount. If you reject, both of you will receive 0 points. The game is completely anonymous; 
the other player will never know your identity, neither will you know who you are playing with. The players are randomly 
assigned to each other; in every trial, you will play with a new opponent.  
For example, Player A makes the following proposition for you: 
  
He/she keeps 60 points, and you get 40 




If you decide to reject (and hence, click on the “No” response), both of you will receive 0 points. However, if you decide 
to accept, you will receive 40 points and Player A will receive 60. 
 
You will have to click on the option you want to go with. Let’s say you accept this offer. At the end of the experiment 
we randomly choose one trial out of the 16 you will play. If this was the randomly chosen trial Player A will receive 60 
points meaning 180 Forint, while the other player will receive 40 points; which means 120 Forints. Keep this in mind, 
while doing the experiment. 
 
As we told you we are interested in your initial, intuitive response. First, we want you to respond with the very first 
answer that comes to mind. You don't need to think about it. Just give the first answer that intuitively comes to mind as 
quickly as possible. To assure this, a time limit was set for the first response, which is going to be 3 seconds. When there 
is 1 second left, the background colour will turn to yellow to let you know that the deadline is approaching. Please make 
sure to answer before the deadline passes.  Next, the problem will be presented again and you can take all the time you 
want to actively reflect on it. Once you have made up your mind you enter your final response.  
Both your initial and final decision will be included in the lottery to determine how much money you and the other 
player will receive.  
 
At no point in time will you be informed about the identity of another participant. Likewise, the other participants will 
not be informed about your identity. Thus, all payments will be made anonymously. That is, the other participants do 
not learn how much you earned in the experiment. 
 
After you made your choice and clicked on it, you will be automatically taken to the next page. 
After you have entered your first and final answer we will also ask you to indicate how hard you found it to make a 
decision. 
 
Press "Next" if you are ready to start the practice session!” 
 
Pay-out structure:  As it is clear from the instructions, the game was incentivized and anonymous. 
All participants played the game as second-mover (Player B). However, to determine the pay-out, we 
randomly paired participants and decided who would be paid as Player A and B. Then, we randomly 
selected a decision from Player B and we paid both players accordingly. Hence, although—as in 
Sanfey et al. (2003)—deception was used in that the offers from Player A were predetermined, the 
participants’ decisions could have real monetary repercussions for another player.   
 
Study 3 (Public Good Game) main two-response study  
 
The literal instructions that were used stated the following (translated from Hungarian): 
 
“In this experiment, you have the opportunity to earn money up to $1. During the experiment, you can collect points. 
The points you earn during the experiment will be converted at the following rate: 1 point = 0.30 cents. 
 
This experiment will include 16 trials. In every trial, you will make two decisions, and at the end of the experiment we 
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randomly choose one of your decisions and you will receive money corresponding to the number of points you earned 
(see details below). 
 
In each trial, we will ask you to play a simple game in which there are always two players (Player A and B). You are 
always going to play as player A, and you are always going to be allocated 100 points (just like Player B). You can make a 
decision whether to put this number of points into a “common pool”. Your opponent will be presented with the same 
decision. In every game, we multiply the number of points contributed to the common pool (by a factor between 1.2 and 
2.9) and will divide this amount equally between the two players. In every game, you are going to be paired with a new 
opponent. 
 
Imagine the following situation: You decided to contribute the 100 points you received, and your opponent decided to 
do so too. Thus, there will be 200 points in the common pool (100 of each player). Imagine that in this game the 
multiplier is 1.5. Hence, the 200 points get multiplied by 1.5 such that there will be 300 points in the common pool. This 
amount gets split evenly between the two of you. Hence, both of you will end up with 150 points after this game. Both 
of you will gain 150 points. However, imagine that the other player didn’t contribute to the pool, only you did. This will 
mean that there will be 100*1.5 = 150 points in the common pool. The common pool always gets split in two so you will 
end up with 75 points in this game. Player B will also receive 75 points from the common pool in addition to their 100 
points they decided to keep for themselves. Hence, Player B will make 175 points in this game. If neither one of you 
contributes to the pool, you both end up with your original 100 points. 
 
The game is completely anonymous; the other player will never know your identity, neither will you know who you are 
playing with. The players are randomly assigned to each other; in every trial, you will play with a new opponent. All 
players (both A and B) are fully informed about the rules of the game. 
 
To help you grasp the payoff structure, in every game you are going to be presented with a payoff matrix. The numbers 
in black  (numbers before the slash) always represent what you would gain in a given situation. The numbers in grey 
(numbers after the slash) tell you what  Player “B” would win. Here’s an example: 
 
 
 Player B contributes Player B doesn't contribute 
You contribute 300 / 300 150 / 250 
You don't contribute 250 / 150 100 / 100 
  
So, if you decide to contribute in this example (and hence, click on the “Yes” response), and Player B decides to 
contribute as well, both of you will receive 300 points. However, if you decide not to contribute, but Player B does 
contribute, you will receive 250 points and Player B will receive 150. 
 
You will have to click on the option you want to go with. Let’s say you contributed, but Player B didn’t. At the end of 
the experiment we randomly choose one trial out of the 16 you will play. If this was the randomly chosen trial Player B 
will receive 150 points meaning $0.45, while you will receive 250 points; which means $0.75. Keep this in mind, while 
doing the experiment. 
 
As we told you we are interested in your initial, intuitive response. First, we want you to respond with the very first 
answer that comes to mind. You don't need to think about it. Just give the first answer that intuitively comes to mind as 
quickly as possible. To assure this, a time limit was set for the first response, which is going to be 6 seconds. When there 
is 1 second left, the background colour will turn to yellow to let you know that the deadline is approaching. Please make 
sure to answer before the deadline passes.  Next, the problem will be presented again and you can take all the time you 
want to actively reflect on it and enter your final response. 
 
Both your initial and final decision will be included in the lottery to determine how much money you and the other 
player will receive. 
  
At no point in time will you be informed about the identity of another participant. Likewise, the other participants will 
not be informed about your identity. Thus, all payments will be made anonymously. That is, the other participants do 




After you made your choice and clicked on it, you will be automatically taken to the next page. 
 
Press "Next" if you are ready to start the practice session!” 
 
Pay-out structure:  As it is clear from the instructions, the game was incentivized and anonymous. 
Participants were told that each game was played with a different anonymous person and that their 
identity would never be revealed. To determine the pay-out, we randomly paired participants and we 
randomly selected a trial for each pair (either initial or final response on the trial). Participants were 
paid based on the decision made on that specific trial. 
 
Study 4 forced deliberation two-response instructions  
 
The literal instructions that were used stated the following (translated from Hungarian): 
 
“As we told you we are interested in your initial, intuitive response. First, we want you to respond with the very first 
answer that comes to mind. You don't need to think about it. Just give the first answer that intuitively comes to mind as 
quickly as possible. To assure this, a time limit was set for the first response, which is going to be 4 seconds. When there 
is 1 second left, the background colour will turn to yellow to let you know that the deadline is approaching. Please make 
sure to answer before the deadline passes.  Next, the problem will be presented again and you can take all the time you 
want to actively reflect on it. To make sure that you are actually reflecting on the problem, you will not be able to 
provide a response in the first 10 seconds. Once the 10 seconds have passed, and you have made up your mind, you can 




B. Supplementary analyses 
 
Combined Study 1-7 results and analyses 
 To get the most general picture of the results we also ran an analysis on the combined Study 
1-7 data. For all statistical random effect mixed model analyses on the combined data we included 
the individual studies as a random effect to the model (in addition to the random effect of 
participants and items) whenever possible. In case we ran into singularity problems, the random 
effect of study was excluded (marked with *) or the random effect of study and items were both 
excluded (marked with **). 
 
 Selfish and prosocial correction rate test. The selfish, b = -2.46, p < 0.0001, and prosocial, b = -1.86, 
p < 0.0001, correction rate on the standard trials were significantly lower than 50%.  
 
 Guessing. The selection rate of the selfish/prosocial response option in the control trials was 
86.7% (SD = 34) which significantly differed from chance, b = 3.67, p < 0.0001. The average 
standard trial stability was 77.7% (SD = 21.5) which was significantly higher than 50% chance, t 
(746) = 35.25, p < 0.0001. 
 
Fast/Slow trial analysis  
 Based on a median split on the initial response time we calculated the correction rates for the 
fastest and slowest half of standard trials in each individual study. Table S3 (fast) and S4 (slow) give 
an overview of the results (see Table S2 for the overall figures). If our deadline was not stringent 
enough and allowed (some) participants to engage in deliberation in the initial response stage, one 
expects that the correction rate should be higher for fast vs slow initial responses (since slow 
responders had more time to engage in possible preemptive deliberation). Results showed this was 
not the case. Even for the fastest half of responses, the correction rate remained floored. 
 Note that given the reduced sample size in the fast/slow analysis (and moderator analyses  
below, i.e., half of the original trials or less), we ran the statistical mixed model test on the combined 
Study 1-7 data. Exploratory analyses on the individual study data pointed to frequent singularity 
issues or were not possible because of the need to remove the random effect of subjects. 
Descriptive data and CIs for each individual study can be found in the corresponding tables and 
indicate that the findings are robust across studies. Results of the statistical analysis showed that 
correction rates for both fast (CorS, b = -7.53, p < 0.0001*; CorP, b = -2.1, p < 0.0001) and slow 
(CorS, b = -2.2, p < 0.0001; CorP, b = -1.77, p < 0.0001) trials were statistically lower than 50%.  
  
Moderators 
 Gender. Table S2 shows the direction of chance and correction index results across gender. 
Table S5 (males) and S6 (females) show results for both genders separately. For the statistical 
analyses, we again focused on the combined Study 1-7 data. Results showed that correction rates for 
both females (CorS, b = -2.3, p < 0.0001; CorP, b = -1.8, p < 0.0001) and males (CorS, b = -2.91, p < 
0.0001*; CorP, b = -2.1, p < 0.0001) were statistically lower than 50%.  Given that it has been 
suggested that gender might specifically affect correction in the Dictator Game (but not other 
games, Rand, 2017) we also ran a separate analysis that focused on Dictator Game studies only 
(Study 1, 4, and 5). Here too correction rates for both females (CorS, b = -2.81, p < 0.0001**; CorP, 
b = -1.75, p < 0.0001**) and males (CorS, b = -2.58, p < 0.0001**; CorP, b = -2.23, p < 0.0001**) 




  Experience. At the end of each study we asked participants to indicate how frequently they 
had participated in similar experiments. Following Rand et al. (2012) we analysed results for 
inexperienced participants who responded they had never participated in similar studies (Table S7) 
and all other experienced participants (Table S8).  We ran statistical analyses on the combined Study 
1-7 data. The analyses showed that the correction rates for inexperienced participants (CorS, b = -
2.22, p < 0.0001; CorP, b = -1.71, p < 0.0001) and experienced participants (CorS, b = -3.36, p < 
0.0001*; CorP, b = -2.02, p < 0.0001 ) were statistically lower than 50%.   
  
 First trial. We also ran an analysis (standard logistic regression – every participant contributed 
with one item to this analysis) that was restricted to the first standard trial that participants were 
presented with. Table S9 shows the results. Analyses showed that correction rates on the first trial 
(CorS, b = -1.64, p < 0.0001; CorP, b = -1.21, p < 0.0001) were statistically lower than 50%.   
  
No load exclusion analysis  
 In all our studies we discarded trials on which the load memorization task was failed. This 
eliminates the possibility that participants neglected and traded-off the load task to deliberate during 
the initial economic game choice.  However, although the number of discarded trials was acceptable 
(overall 12% of all trials), in theory, this might lead to a selection confound (Bouwmeester et al., 
2017). Table S10 shows the data without application of the load exclusion criterion. Results are 
consistent with the original analysis (deviation average CorS = 0.1%, CorP = 1.1%). 
  
Difficulty rating analysis 
In Study 1-4 participants were asked to indicate how hard they found it to make a decision 
after each initial and final response (“How hard did you find it to make a decision? Please type a number from 
0 (absolutely not hard) to 100 (very hard)”). Figure S2 shows the results for each of the three games 
combined in each of the two response stages on the standard trials. Our key interests concerned the 
initial experienced difficulty for trials in which the initial choice was corrected after deliberation or 
not. Previous two response studies in the logical and moral reasoning field (Bago & De Neys, 2017, 
2019; Thompson et al., 2011) established that when people corrected their initial response after 
deliberation, they indicated to have experienced more difficulties to arrive at their initial decision 
(i.e., feel more conflicted or be less certain) than when they did not correct their response. Visual 
inspection of Figure S2 points to a similar trend. The corrective SP and PS trials are initially 
experienced as more difficult than the non-corrective SS and PP trials. A mixed-effect linear 
regression model (accounting for the random intercept of participants and items) that contrasted the 
experienced difficulty rating for the initial response in the non-corrective and corrective response 
categories indicated that this trend was significant, χ2 (1) = 62.87, p < 0.0001, b = 9.35. The same 
pattern was observed for each of the individual games: Dictator Game (Study 1 and 4 combined), χ2 
(1) = 24, p < 0.0001, b = 7.17, Ultimatum Game (Study 2), χ2 (1) = 36.84, p < 0.0001, b = 16.81, and 
the Public Goods Game (Study 3), χ2 (1) = 5.65, p = 0.018, b = 6.1.  
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A   Experienced difficulty at initial response 
 
 
B  Experienced difficulty at final response 
 
 
Figure S2.  Average experienced difficulty on standard trials for different initial-to-final choice 
types at the initial (A) and final (B) response stage. First/second letter refers to initial/final 
choice. S = Selfish choice. P = Prosocial choice. Combined data from Study 1-4. Error bars are 






 Standard  Control 




52.8% (50) 50.4% (50) 77% (50) 78.5% (50) 
Study 2 – 
Ultimatum Game 
 
38.5% (48.7) 42% (49.4) 95.3% (21.2) 95.6% (20.5) 
Study 3 – Public 
Goods Game 
 
61.8% (48.6) 66.2% (47.3) 86% (34.7) 83.8% (36.8) 
Study 4 – 
Dictator Game 
 
45.7% (49.9) 44.2% (49.7) 81.2% (39.1) 81.9% (38.5) 
Study 5 – 
Dictator Game 
 
63.3% (48.2) 56.8% (49.6) 86.6% (34.1) 89.5% (30.7) 
Study 6 – 
Ultimatum Game 
 
59.2% (49.2) 51% (50) 96.7% (17.9) 98.6% (11.7) 
Study 7 – Public 
Goods Game 
 
57.1% (49.5) 64.4% (47.9) 85.6% (35.1) 87% (33.7) 
Overall average 
 53.9% (49.9) 53.2% (49.9) 86.7% (34) 87.7% (32.8) 
 
Table S1. Frequency of selfish choices on standard and control trials. On control trials 




 SS PP SP PS CorS CorP 
       
































































































































































Table S2. Frequency of four initial-to-final choice patterns and correction indexes on 
standard trials. First/second letter refers to initial/final choice. S = Selfish choice. P = Prosocial 
choice. CorS = Selfish correction rate, CorP = Prosocial correction rate. n = number of trials. 
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Table S3. Frequency of four initial-to-final choice patterns and correction indexes for 
fastest half of initial standard trials. First/second letter refers to initial/final choice. S = Selfish 
choice. P = Prosocial choice. CorS = Selfish correction rate, CorP = Prosocial correction rate. n = 
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Table S4. Frequency of four initial-to-final choice patterns and correction indexes for 
slowest half of initial standard trials. First/second letter refers to initial/final choice. S = 
Selfish choice. P = Prosocial choice. CorS = Selfish correction rate, CorP = Prosocial correction 
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Table S5. Frequency of four initial-to-final choice patterns and correction indexes on 
standard trials for males. First/second letter refers to initial/final choice. S = Selfish choice. P = 
Prosocial choice. CorS = Selfish correction rate, CorP = Prosocial correction rate. n = number of 
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Table S6. Frequency of four initial-to-final choice patterns and correction indexes on 
standard trials for females. First/second letter refers to initial/final choice. S = Selfish choice. P 
= Prosocial choice. CorS = Selfish correction rate, CorP = Prosocial correction rate. n = number 




 N SS PP SP PS CorS CorP 
        
































































































































































Table S7. Frequency of four initial-to-final choice patterns and correction indexes on 
standard trials for inexperienced participants. First/second letter refers to initial/final choice. 
S = Selfish choice. P = Prosocial choice. CorS = Selfish correction rate, CorP = Prosocial 
correction rate. n = number of trials. Values between square brackets present the 95% confidence 
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Table S8. Frequency of four initial-to-final choice patterns and correction indexes on 
standard trials for experienced participants. First/second letter refers to initial/final choice. S 
= Selfish choice. P = Prosocial choice. CorS = Selfish correction rate, CorP = Prosocial 
correction rate. n = number of trials. Values between square brackets present the 95% confidence 



















































































































































































































Table S9. Frequency of four initial-to-final choice patterns and correction indexes on the 
first standard trial. First/second letter refers to initial/final choice. S = Selfish choice. P = 
Prosocial choice. CorS = Selfish correction rate, CorP = Prosocial correction rate. n = number of 
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Table S10. Frequency of four initial-to-final choice patterns and correction indexes on 
standard trials when trials with incorrect response on the load question were not excluded. 
First/second letter refers to initial/final choice. S = Selfish choice. P = Prosocial choice. CorS = 
Selfish correction rate, CorP = Prosocial correction rate. n = number of trials. Values between 
square brackets present the 95% confidence interval.   
 
 
 
 
 
